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The Federal Railroad Administration-Lobbyist
Participation In Drafting
Organizationand Process
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was created when DOT was es-

tablished in 1966.11 Executive reorganization at that time authorized the
transfer of three Bureaus: Railroad Safety, " The Office of High Speed Ground
Transportation,'45 and the Alaska Railroad 4 ' to the FRA. Previously these
units had been under the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Commerce Department, and the Interior Department respectively. 47 Their

consolidation under FRA was intended to develop a coordinated national approach to the management and development of rail transportation activities.'
Research, program analysis and enforcement authority in all matters pertaining to rail transportation and safety were to function as a single unit within
4
the overall organizational structure of DOT.1'
The Office of the Administrator directs the activities of the three bureaus
and the FRA as a unit. Staff assistance is provided through five offices: Administration, Public Affairs, Hearing Examiner, Chief Counsel,10 and Policy and
Program Analysis.' It is primarily the latter two offices that are involved in
the legislative process.

The Chief Counsel's Office has a staff of eight attorneys and five secretaries.' The general duties of the office are comparable on a smaller scale to the
functions of DOT's Office of the General Counsel. 5 Specific tasks pertaining
143. Dep't of Transportation Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 932.
144. The Railroad Safety Bureau is composed of five divisions and a Director's office and is
responsible for all aspects of railroad safety including the initiation of rules, guidelines, standards
and legislative proposals. DOT Manual, supra footnote 60 at VII-15.
145. The Office of High Speed Ground Transportation plans and implements research and
development in high speed transportation. GSA U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 386
(1970-71).
146. The Alaska Railroad operates a total of 482.7 miles of railroad throughout Alaska. Id.
147. Id.
148. Supra note 143. DOT Manual, supra footnote 60 at VII-5.
149. Supra note 143.
150. DOT Manual, supra footnote 60, at VII-5.
151. Id. VIl-9 to V11-14.
152. The figures are not inflexible, although eight attorneys seems to be the standard.
O'Driscoll interview, supra footnote 68.
153. The DOT Manual, supra footnote 60, at VII-10, lists the following as functions of the
FRA's Chief Counsel's Office: (a) Provides legal counsel and advice to the FRA Administrator
and other offices of the FRA; (b) Directs and administers all legal services required in the operation
of the FRA; (c) Cooperates with the General Counsel and other legal offices of DOT; (d) Plans,
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to railroad activities can be divided into five major categories: legislation,
enforcement of laws and regulations, administrative rule making, policy review
and litigation. Each of these is the primary responsibility of a senior attorney." 4
The Office of Policy and Program Analysis is the chief adviser to the Administrator on policy development and legislative recommendations. The office
establishes the FRA's intermediate and long-range goals, critically evaluates
the operational achievements of the Administration's programs, conducts systematic studies on the needs and problems of rail transportation and safety,
and reviews, evaluates and proposes policy on legislation pertaining to the
55
improvement of the functions of the FRA and railroad activities generally.
For specific legislative measures, the FRA's general procedure is to establish
policy guidelines for an area through the work of a "legislative team." The
work is transferred usually in conference to the Chief Counsel's Office, and
specifically to Mr. O'Driscoll. There the legislative proposal is examined on
its merits, refined and drafted into legal terminology. The measure is then
reviewed and analyzed in both offices, with objections noted and changes recommended. "As the legislative process is repeated," one spokesman noted, "a
continuing and working relationship on the matter is established; the two offices, although each has distinctive duties, in fact contribute in a joint and
complimentary way, especially as the idea develops into a concrete legislative
proposal."' 6
The RailroadSafety Bill
Origins of the Bill
The files on the Railroad Safety Bill indicate that FRA's Office of Chief
Counsel had compiled statistics showing a sharply increased number of railroad
directs and reviews all legal activities concerning legislation; (e) Represents the FRA in all legal
proceedings involving rail transportation issues; (f) Supervises and performs all legal activities
involving the enforcement of rail and pipeline safety laws and regulations; (g) Serves as liaison and
assistant to the DOJ in the prosecution or defense of any suit involving the FRA; (h) Performs all
legal activities in relation to the development, issuance and interpretation of administrative rules
and regulations; (i) Participates in the administrative rulemaking proceedings and performs legal
duties relating to appeals from federal contracts or compliance with applicable work laws and
regulations.
154. O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68.
155. DOT Manual, supra footnote 60 at VII-12. The Office of Policy and Program Analysis
is divided into three divisions whose specific research responsibilities are respectively: policy analysis, program analysis and science and technology. Each division's staff works under the Director
of the Office of Policy and Program Analysis who coordinates, reviews and approves policy and
program recommendations.
156. O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68.
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accidents throughout the country in December 1967.151 These figures were
available to the agency's policy makers through at least two sources: the National Transportation Safety Board and the Bureau of Railroad Safety. 15s Legislative response to the situation within FRA, however, was negligible until
some five months later, 59 when Senator Magnuson, citing a letter to the Washington Post, which noted the concern of the National Transportation Safety
Board asked specifically for a report on the matter. 60 What followed was a
flurry of activity on the subject by Congress, public interest groups and the
agency.
On May 2, 1968, Rep. Staggers, Chairman of the House Interstate Commerce Committee, introduced H.R. 16,980, which proposed a substantial revision of railroad laws.' At that time, Chairman Staggers indicated that his
committee would hold early hearings on the matter. On May 8th the Association of American Railroads (AARR), representing the industry's management,
claimed that the safety record of the railroads was good. 2 Two days later Alan
Boyd, then Secretary of DOT, addressed himself to the issue of railroad safety
before a Denver Chamber of Commerce meeting. 3 By May 16th the Chief
Counsel's Office of the FRA, in conjunction with staff members of the policy
unit, had prepared an outline for the agency's testimony at the House heai ings
scheduled for the next year.'64 The outline included a review of the current
railroad safety program, a statement advocating the need for changed authority, a description of the current state regulatory programs and a background
157. DOT-FRA note 4. 1967 was the 10th consecutive year in which railroad accidents increased. These figures were available to the FRA on a quarterly basis, but they declined to initiate
stricter enforcement of existing statutes or new legislation to prevent safety hazards in areas which
were not regulated.
158. Both offices are charged by statute with responsibilities in the rail safety area. The NTSB
investigates and issues reports on all railroad accidents; the Bureau of Railroad Safety proposes,
administers and enforces safety regulations. In an interview, it was noted that the FRA's Chief
Counsel's Office enforces the rail safety statutes through reports which the Bureau of Safety and
the NTSB acquire independently on railroad accidents. O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68.
159. There is no information in the FRA's files during this period relative to the causes of the
accident increase or on the introduction of rail safety legislation. The interviewers asked spokesmen
for the FRA whether there was activity that was not reflected in the files. The responses were
varied. Some stated vaguely that "there were on-going discussions on methods of improving rail
safety." Specifics, however, could not be given. Others stated frankly that the FRA did not have
the muscle to initiate the type of broadbased safety bill that was necessary to adequately attack
the problem. Others stated that the figures were generally ignored and activity, if there was any,
related to the Staggers bill which had been introduced in December of the previous session.
160. DOT-FRA note 5.
161.
DOT-FRA'note 6. H.R. 16,980, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1968).
162. DOT-FRA note 7.
163. DOT-FRA note 8.
164. DOT-FRA note 9.
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discussion of the agency's railroad safety legislation." 5
There was little activity during the changeover from the Johnson to the
Nixon administration. Two memoranda were circulated during this time. The
first was a draft study of the estimated cost of broadened safety regulation
which concluded that the "value of the safety results should be commensurate
with the cost of carrying out and adhering to the regulations.' 16 The second
included two drafts of H.R. 16,980 written by the FRA for Congressman
Stagger's committee and a letter from the Secretary's office discussing two
provisions of the legislation." 7
However, a background memorandum dated November 1968 and interviews
in the FRA disclosed that the House hearings and subsequent committee work
had produced a markedly negative reaction from the three principal interests
involved: railroad management, labor, and the state regulatory authorities. The
memorandum noted that "while the majority of the Committee was probably
in favor of some kind of legislation, the bill, as presented to them, was not being
well received . . . putting aside indirect factors such as the gas pipeline safety
controversy, the breadth and scope of the bill was apparently disturbing to both
labor and management."'6 8 Concern was expressed over the failure of railroad
management and the union to get together on the legislation. It noted that the
carriers were opposed in toto to the bills introduced; that the union had proposed 44 amendments to H.R. 16,980; and that in the first week after the
hearings railroad management had been unable to react, while labor introduced
a completely new bill. 6 9
Interest Group Opposition
Management
DOT spokesmen indicated that this type of opposition arose for different reasons among the interest groups. The railroads, it was said, were fearful of the
cost and extent of any new regulatory authority in this area. They recognized
that the federal statutory authority was a "hodge-podge", largely piecemeal
gains scored by the unions, and that as a result, their position in the hearings
would be vulnerable. Moreover, it appeared as though the earlier regulations
governing safety had been minimally enforced and the means and standards of
165. Id. This initial draft of the Department's testimony on rail safety legislation was done
substantially by Mr. O'Driscoll of the FRA's Chief Counsel's Office.
166. DOT-FRA note II.
167. DOT-FRA note 13.
168. DOT-FRA note 14.
169.

Id.
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that supervision were antiquated in relation to the technological gains made in
this area during the last twenty years. Infrequent enforcement, it was noted,
was not just the product of federal law and the FRA, but reflected the problem
of conflicting and inconsistent regulation on the part of the various state agencies controlling rail transportation. Perhaps equally important, management
feared that encroachment in the safety area in the person of stricter federal
authority and enforcement of safety statutes would precipitate extending and
activating the FRA's general authority over a broad range of railroad activ170
ity.
The Union
Union concerns involved what they considered to be the radical approach of
the legislation itself.17 1 The new safety legislation was designed to replace all
1 72
the current existing statutes with one all encompassing railroad safety law.
Ideally this revision and codification of the existing statutes would bring a
marked improvement to the status of union members; but this could not be
guaranteed. Thus, in addition to the legislative and court battles that could be
anticipated, at a minimum the unions would lose the security and protection

of the existing law for which, as Mr. Chesser noted in the hearings, "the
Brotherhood had fought so dearly to get over the last 60 years." 17 Examina-

tion of the legislative history of past federal safety laws shows that nearly all
were the result of government reactions to major safety defects and were in-

tended to provide coverage to railroad employees in specific areas rather than
to present a comprehensive program of accident prevention. The fact that the
unions proposed 44 amendments to the Staggers bill is indicative of their real
concern that the breadth and revision wrought by the proposed legislation not
innundate and subvert the minor gains already secured by their activities. " 4
DOT Activity
DOT foresaw five major problem areas in the bill that would present the

170. Anonymous interviews in FRA and with congressional staff who worked on the bill.
Amending the above, Mr. O'Driscoll felt that the very nature of railroad accidents and the many
factors which cause them complicated Federal regulatory enforcement efforts. O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68.
171. See DOT-FRA note 14.
172. The principal bill before the House Committee, H.R. 16,980,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968),
contained a provision repealing all existing railroad safety laws upon the Secretary's issuance of
departmental regulations preempting the particular area.
173. Hearings on H.R. 16,980 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportationof the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). DOT-FRA note 14.
174. Id.
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greatest difficulties to the committee: (I) the scope of the law relating to the
qualification of employees; (2) federal preemption of state jurisdiction; (3) the
inclusion of employees in civil and criminal penalties; (4) the use of Administrative Procedure Act requirements in the issuance of regulations; and (5) the
definition of railroad commerce in relation to local transit and operations.'75
Specifically, the Department suggested that an in-depth study be conducted on
the relationship of labor to management under the coverage provisions of the
Act, while the FRA considered other anticipated problems.' Finally, the Department concluded that Chairman Staggers had indicated that he was going
to have "some" legislation.'77 At this point the FRA was forced to cooperate
with the Staggers Committee in order to secure railroad-union agreement on
the bill, rather than addressing the issue of rail safety objectively.'
There is ample indication that the FRA continued to work on the key areas
of conflict through the latter part of 1968.11 Preliminary legislative material
for the first session of the 91st Congress in the form of briefing memoranda
were prepared by the Chief Counsel's Office.' There is also ample evidence
of extensive contacts between the interest groups, the FRA's Chief Counsel's
Office and higher administration policy makers.' The end result of this activity was the emergence of the tripartite task force on railroad safety (hereinafter referred to as the Task Force).8 2
The Task Force
The utilization of the Task Force as a means of resolving the conflicting interests of the railroad lobbying forces is a key development in the legislative
process.' 83 It is unclear who suggested this approach, but departmental spokes175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. DOT-FRA notes 15 and 16. See also text accompanying footnotes 186-188, infra, discussing the position the FRA and DOT took on the competing demands of the outside interest groups.
179. See e.g., DOT-FRA note 19, in which the FRA Administrator briefs the new Secretary
of DOT, Mr. Volpe, on the railroad safety legislation.
180. See DOT-FRA notes 17, 21 and 22. On the legal level Mr. Bernstein, an attorney for
railroad management, reviewed and commented on the provisions of the bill offered by Congressman Staggers after the May, 1968 hearings, indicating management's continuing concern with the
specifics of any proposal in this area. DOT-FRA note 17. Labor had scheduled a meeting for
February 14, 1969 with Secretary Volpe and the Department's principal railroad policy-makers.
DOT-FRA note 21. The files do not adequately show the various pressures brought by the groups
involved. During the fall and into the month of January, 1969 there were a number of meetings
between policy-makers of the FRA and all of the major lobbying groups involved.
181. DOT-FRA note 22.
182. See text accompanying footnotes 186-205, infra, discussing the involvement of the interest
groups and use of the Task Force as a means of securing legislative approval.
183. DOT-FRA note 22.
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men indicated that "it was established for purposes of legislative approval."'8 4
This recognized the necessity for the Department to establish its neutrality. The
three groups-labor, management and the state regulatory authorities-had
too much influence, both in DOT and Congress, for any one side to trust the
matter to an early and open committee hearing." 5 Moreover, the Nixon Administration and the FRA saw advantages in the idea of a Task Force from
the standpoint of discerning common concerns in a non-public forum. It permitted DOT to say that it had in fact permitted an airing of views; and perhaps
most important, it allowed more time for the new administration to settle itself
legally and politically on the issues involved. 8'
The establishment of the Task Force was announced by the Secretary on
April 18, 1969. Its membership included DOT and FRA representatives as well
as the lobbying interests." 7 During this period a major bill similar to labor's
earlier proposals was introduced by Senator Hartke, the Chairman of the
Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation. Department spokesmen indicated the Hartke bill was used as a starting point for the bill developed by
the Task Force.8 8
While the Task Force continued its efforts to establish acceptable "legislative
recommendations," Senate hearings wereheld on the Hartke bill. 9 Mr. Whit184. Both departmental spokesmen interviewed and the attorney representing the interest
groups recognized this general viewpoint.
185. Id. This obviously permitted the parties to examine the problem outside the public forum
of the congressional committee. There was much talk on the part of the FRA that the Task Force's
purpose was to formulate specific proposals applicable to railroad safety as a unit. See text
accompanying footnotes 186-205, infra. The files indicate, however, that the issues were more
complex and that the situation developed into a classic of politically motivated negotiation. DOTFRA notes 36-54.
186. DOT-FRA notes 27 and 29.
187. There were twelve official members of the original Task Force: Mr. Ward, Chairman,
Michigan Public Service Commission; Mr. Fain, Member, Missouri Public Service Commission;
Mr. Vukasin, Member, California Public Utilities Commission; Mr. Goodfellow, President,
AARR: Mr. Lamprecht, Vice-President, Southern Pacific Railroad; Mr. Thorne, Vice-President,
Operations, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad; Mr. Cowan, Vice-President, Operations, C & 0B & 0 Railroad; Mr. Leighty, Chairman, Railroad Labor Executives' Association; Mr. Beattie,
Executive Secretary, Railroad Labor Executives' Association; Mr. Chesser, Vice-President and
National Legislative representative, United Transportation Union; Mr. Skutt, Ass't. Grand Chief
Engineer, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; Mr. Whitman, (Chairman), Administrator FRA.
Those members who became principally involved in the drafting and processing of the railroad
safety legislation were: Mr. Chesser, Mr. Goodfellow, and Mr. Bloom, who was later added to
the Task Force as President of the NARUC.
188. DOT-FRA note 24.
189. Hearings on S. 1933, S. 2915 and S. 3061 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportalion of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969
Hearings]. This hearing, relating to the Hartke proposal, was held on May 20, 1969. The principal
witnesses of the Department were Mr. Reed, Chairman of the NTSB; Mr. Broune, Assistant
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man, the FRA Administrator at this time, gave a brief statement on the bill
before the Senate Committee. He outlined the necessity for some legislation,
but indicated that the work of the Task Force should be examined before the
90
It seems that the hearDepartment committed itself to a specific approach.1
ings and the Hartke bill itself were intended to generate some partisan support
for the labor approach. Thus perhaps affecting the views of the Task Force and
certainly encouraging the early issuing of the report.
On June 30, 1969, Secretary Volpe issued the Task Force Report and called
it a "landmark of cooperation."'' However, the files on the safety legislation
and interviews indicate that DOT had settled for less than they had expected.
As late as June 2nd, Mr. Whitman, the chairman of the Task Force who acted
informally as the chief conciliator and moderator of the group, analyzed points
of agreement and differences between the three groups and outlined a draft of
the Task Force Report, accompanied by a statement of positions, a recommended draft bill, and a section-by-section analysis of its provisions."' Divisions on the major points of the bill, had forced the FRA to abandon this
package plan and accept instead a report establishing eight basic recommendations upon which the interest groups could agree.'

Secretary, Research and Technology; Mr. Whitman, FRA Administrator; and Mr. Corcoran,
Chief Counsel, FRA.
190. Mr. Whitman, for example, indicated early in his testimony that the Task Force "had
already met three days." 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 36. To Senator Hartke's specific
inquiry as to whether he "basically [found] any reason to be in opposition to S. 1933, which
contains broad authority over railroad safety for the Department of Transportation," Mr. Whitman replied, "Mr. Chairman, I pointed out to the Task Force that I would approach this problem
with an open mind, and until they give me their recommendations, 1 am in the embarrassing
position of not wishing to prejudge what they might say." 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at
50.
191. DOT-FRA note 36.
192. DOT-FRA notes 34 and 35.
193. DOT-FRA note 35. Departmental spokesmen commented that "realistically", they
thought that cooperation of the interest groups to the extent that they established areas of agreement and that a draft bill of sorts was produced indicated that at some reasonable time a measure
would be before the Congress. The eight basic recommendations in substance were: (1) That the
Secretary have authority to promulgate reasonable regulations in all areas of railroad safety
through such procedures as will protect the rights of all interested parties; (2) That a National
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee be established which shall consist of representatives of all
major interests and which shall advise the Secretary of the reasonableness of such regulations as
he may propose; (3) That the Advisory Committee study the various laws pertaining to the transportation of dangerous explosives by rail; (4) That a three year research program be initiated and
funded by the Department; (5) That existing rail safety statutes should remain unless preempted
by federal regulations and that the administration of such programs be conducted through a
federal-state partnership similar to the certification principles of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act of 1968; (6) That formal employee training programs be expanded by labor and management;
(7) That an expanded grade crossing program be undertaken; (8) That the FRA should revise its
rules for the reporting of rail accidents.
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Thereafter, through the summer of 1969, the Task Force attempted to fulfill
their original charge and draft a railroad safety bill. Differences among the
lobbying interests represented, however, continued to forestall the development
of a safety bill, with disagreement evident even on the eight recommendations
initially agreed upon.' 4 The FRA was again forced to reconcile the differences
between the special interest groups.
The extent of the lobbyist's direct involvement is amply illustrated by the
files. For example, on July 17th, 18th and 23rd Mr. Loftus and Mr. O'Driscoll
of the FRA staff commented on a revised early draft of the safety legislation." 5 In the next two weeks a separate draft was compiled by the Task Force
as a whole, with comments to the August 5th draft requested by the Association
of American Railroads. Mr. Lyon, the FRA Administrator, wrote still a third
draft after the Task Force meeting of August 14th. 199 The files also reveal that
substantive comments during this period were received from Mr. Fain of the
state regulatory agencies and Mr. Chesser, the labor representative.'97 On September 12th, a draft bill entitled "The Federal Railroad Safety and Research
Act of 1969" was agreed upon by the Task Force as the version most acceptable
to the members." 8 In transmitting the draft bill to the Secretary, each interest
group noted its own differences, confirming the anticipated disagreement on
key portions of the bill. 9 The six chief points of contention involved three
broad issues:

194. DOT-FRA notes 38-54. The consensus was that the interest groups had clearly anticipated
areas of dispute on the specific provisions drafted. The Task Force draft with its written exceptions
seems to confirm in general the point that formal agreement upon specific provisions was a near
impossible task. This does not, however, invalidate the Department's initial reasons for establishing
the Task Force but rather indicates at least three points: first, that there was some procrastination
on the part of the groups involved; second, that the absence of public interest representation on
issues of major social concern is quite apparent; and, third, it gives some indication of the relationship of the Department to the private interest groups. All these features show considerable involvement by the lobbying interests in the executive bill-drafting process. See text accompanying footnotes 241-243, infra, for the Project's assessment of this involvement.
195. DOT-FRA notes 39-42.
196. DOT-FRA notes 43-45.
197. DOT-FRA notes 52 and 53.
198. DOT-FRA note 54.
199. There were six significant differences among the interest groups:
(I) Both labor and the state commissions opposed Section 5 of the bill which provided for the
preemption of state regulatory standards by federal standards. Preemption was limited to situations in which the federal standards were equal to or higher than the state standards;
(2) Labor opposed Section 7, which would repeal the existing federal safety statutes, and
indicated that it would oppose the bill in its entirety if that provision was included;
(3) Labor opposed the penalty provisions in the bill as too low, while management opposed
them as too high; management, moreover, wanted to limit penalties to knowing and willful violations;
(4) Labor wanted the Secretary to have cease and desist enforcement authority, which was not
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question of state regulation, enforcement, and particieffect of the bill upon existing rail statutes, i.e., would
law be repealed, consigned as regulations under the
authority, or continued and reaffirmed as Federal law;
bill's penalty and enforcement scheme."'

Once the Task Force draft had been submitted DOT was able to draft its
own legislation.2"' Although direct participation of the interest groups was
permitted on the Task Force. DOT did not feel restricted to the Task Force
recommendations or to the draft submitted. Some contrary assumptions were
held by certain members of the Task Force, however, and as a result the FRA's
safety legislation, when introduced, created misgivings among the lobbyist
groups."' However, the bill was introduced on October 22, 1969, as S.3061 and
hearings were scheduled for the next week. 03 The period prior to the Senate
hearings was used to draft the DOT bill, to process the legislation with the
OMB, and to prepare legislative materials particularly on distinctions between
the Task Force bill, the Hartke proposal and the administration measure,
S.3061.201 Since the preliminary work of the FRA had been so detailed, these
matters involved primarily the compilation of material already researched
thoroughly. During this drafting and processing stage one notable conflict
involved responsibility for railroad workers health and safety. Significantly,
this was settled by the White House staff and the OMB representative just prior
205
to its introduction.
The Senate Hearings
At the Senate hearings the administration proposal was endorsed by the Secregranted under the Task Force draft;
(5) Labor opposed the bill's failure to include a proviso reaffirming the Railway Labor Act;
and,
(6) Management opposed the failure to include a financial assistance provision by which the
FRA would be required to pay for safety improvements necessary under the act which the railroads
could not afford.
200. See text accompanying footnotes 206-229, infra, for an analysis of the major differences
among the parties in the Senate and House Hearings.
201. DOT-FRA notes 56 and 58-60.
202. The files indicate only Mr. Chesser's concern with the FRA's decision in a power brake
case. DOT-FRA note 53. However, interviews disclosed that problems of reaching an agreed upon
draft had created some ill will among the parties and the question of what specifically the FRA
had or had not committed itself to, caused a general tenseness among the parties. Anonymous
interview, FRA, March, 1971.
203. DOT-FRA note 59.
204. DOT-FRA notes 56-60.
205. DOT-FRA note 61.
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tary of Transportation, the FRA, the National Transportation Safety Board,
and Mr. Goodfellow, the President of the Association of American Railroads
(AARR).20° The Hartke bill, S.1933, was supported primarily by Mr. Chesser,
the national legislative director of the Railroad Labor Executive Association,
a union which represents approximately 280,000 operating employees of the
railroad." 7 The position of the state regulatory agencies, which differed significantly with the labor stand in only one area, was presented by Mr. Bloom of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.2"8 The fourth
principal witness at the hearings was attorney Ralph Nader, a spokesman for
the public interest, who presented an independent analysis of the provisions
which he thought should be included to respond effectively to the rail safety
crisis.2 "' Except for Secretary Volpe and Mr. Nader, all of the main witnesses
before the Committee were members of the original Task Force.
The major areas of concern involved five basic issues.210 Apart from obvious
differences in policy, there were seemingly minor discrepancies in the terminology used by the different parties. Yet, as one Department spokesman indicated,
much depended upon whose interpretation or wording the committees would
"
' In this sense, the safety legislation seemed one of the better examples
accept.21
of the importance attached to the task of choosing and ordering legal terminology.
The first area of significant difference between the witnesses involved the
scope of the bill's coverage. The Administration's proposal stated that the
Secretary's rulemaking authority would cover all areas of safety involving
"railroad operations."2"2 Testimony of the parties soon centered upon whether
this terminology was sufficient to exclude those employees of the railroad not
directly engaged in such activity. Mr. Goodfellow, who favored such exclusion,
objected to the phraseology, arguing that the Committee should clarify its
meaning and confine safety regulations strictly. 2 3 Mr. Chesser, the labor rep206. 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 336 and 358.
207. Id. at 366.
208. Id. at 379.
209. Id. at 406.
210. See footnote 199 supra.
211. O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68. This was fully confirmed in the testimony of the
principal parties involved. See text and accompanying footnotes 206-229 infra.
212. 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 330.
213. He argued that "references to 'railroad operations' were not originated by the Task Force
and do not appear in its draft bill." 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 339. Mr. Goodfellow
also worried about the word "health," which seemingly enlarged the scope and coverage of the
provisions under the Bill. Here he noted,
The same is true of the references to the health of railroad employees. The Task Force
bill related to safety only. We understand that these insertions were made by representatives of the federal government who sought to clarify the relationship between the powers
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resentative, while arguing vigorously that the scope of the Act should be allinclusive, also questioned the use of the terminology, noting that its vagueness
promoted any number of things. 14
A second issue on which the witnesses differed involved the procedure by
which the Secretary would issue safety standards and regulations under the
Act. The Department's proposal called for hearings of "an informal nature"
such that notice and procedure should conform to § 553 of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA). 15 Mr. Goodfellow while supporting the administration's
bill "as it was written," suggested a procedure whereby there would be formal
evidentiary hearings whenever the Secretary found that a substantial question
of disputed fact existed between the parties."1 6 Mr. Chesser stated that the

hearings conducted in accordance with § 553 of the APA would be "unacceptable . . . because it does not guarantee an oral presentation.""' 7 In this regard,
he asserted that under § 2(c) of the Administration's proposal, the Secretary
would be permitted to grant an exemption regarding compliance with a safety
regulation without a formal hearing.2"'
granted by this bill and those granted by . . . S.2788. These insertions may be helpful,
but may also be capable of creating confusion in practice.
Id.
214. 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 366-367. While Mr. Chesser's complaint pertained
to the issue of the Bill's scope, he argued on two grounds in hopes of persuading the Committee
to change the Bill's policy altogether and to affect some change in either the language of the Bill
or its supportive legislative history. With these purposes in mind, the labor representative, as did
Mr. Goodfellow, noted that the RLEA saw "no justification for this departure from the task force
proposal." Id. at 366.
215. Id. at 338.
216. Id. at 360; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522 et seq. (1970). Mr. Goodfellow
noted that his proposal conformed with the Task Force draft which provided that where the
Secretary found "a substantial issue of disputed fact . . . hearing [should be] in accordance with
§§ 556 and 557 of Title 5. This formal proceeding, he noted, would involve sworn testimony, the
right to cross examination, and decision on record, none of which are found in the informal
procedure. Id.
217. Id. at 367. He felt that only an oral presentation would assure "that the FRA will have a
full and sufficient understanding of the problems and positions of the various interested parties
. . . Mr. Chesser, it seems, desires formal hearings under §§ 556 and 557 exclusive of the issues
of proving a "substantial issue of disputed fact." Id.
218. Id. In contrast, the Department feared that formal evidentiary hearings under §§ 556
and 557 or so-called "oral" hearings as advocated by labor, would carry an exorbitant cost. For
example, a hearing examiner system would have to be established involving qualified attorneys,
clerks, etc. Full APA procedures would be applicable, while private attorneys for both the railroad
and labor would be required. Interview with Commander L.D. Santman, DOT General Counsel's
Office, August, 1970. In sum, the procedures would be cumbersome and expensive, and almost
surely forestall efforts to resolve the most important issue-the safety crises. A later interview with
Mr. O'Driscoll established that there had been an agreement between labor and management on
this procedural question, whereby informal and oral presentations could be assured, without entailing the delaying factors incumbent in Sections 556 and 557 of the APA. O'Driscoll Interview, supra
footnote 68.
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The third major issue which divided the key witnesses involved federal
preemption and state participation. These sections easily became the most
contested portions of the bill. Spokesmen suggested that the reason stemmed
inherently from the problem of enforcement and regulation itself. "The
States," it was noted, "did not want the laws and regulations already applicable
to the Railroads to be abrogated; even more important, they wanted assurances
that the existing State enforcement machinery would be able to qualify through
statutory procedural requirements as the enforcement authority for the proposed federal safety regulations." 1 ' The Administration, on the other hand,
wanted to leave complete discretion with the Secretary on the key issues of
prescribing federal safety standards and involving the States in the federal
220
enforcement scheme.
The fourth major issue involved the status of existing federal railroad safety
statutes. The Administration proposal called for the repeal of all existing rail
statutes. The bill would, however, continue the substantive requirements of
those statutes as departmental regulations until they were acted upon by the
Secretary pursuant to the rulemaking procedures established in the Act. 22 ' Mr.
Goodfellow agreed with the Secretary that the existing safety statutes should
be repealed. He asserted that it was a "very important element in the bill." It
preserved the continuity of the existing rules while eliminating from the permanent structure of regulation the "piecemeal and patchy laws" that had been
enacted since 1893.222 Mr. Chesser, speaking as the union representative, was
severly critical of the Administration's attempt to repeal the existing rail safety
legislation. "We have fought too many hard and long years to get the safety
laws that we now have enacted to permit their summary execution.1 222 He
argues that their incorporation as regulations will, moreover, fail to withstand
the objections that they can be changed, repealed or interpreted contrary to
219. O'Driscoll Interview supra footnote 68. Secretary Volpe argued that S.3061 had the
correct approach to the federal-state question. The Department's bill would first establish that the
rules or standards issued by the Secretary under the act would preempt all state and local safety
standards on the subject matter. Thus, under S.3061, state and local standards would remain in
effect until specific federal standards in the same area were issued. 1969 Hearings supra foonote
189 at 340.
220. 1969 Hearings supra foonote 189 at 340-41. On the other hand, past performance at the
federal level established the following offsetting factors:
1. The FRA produced a minimum of investigative and legislative activity particularly during
the 1960's when rail accidents were increasing annually;
2. The FRA had inadequate reporting, investigative and enforcement procedures in the areas
already within the scope of existing federal statutes; and,
3. The complete grant of authority to the Secretary seemed contradictory to the basic issue of
enforcement, since the Secretary still lacked any corrective powers.
221. Id. at 338-39.
222. Id. at 360.
223. Id. at 369.
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their full meaning and application as statutes.2 4 In addition, he notes that the
testimony of the FRA Administrator acknowledged that the federal rail safety
laws covered only 5% of the accidents involving railroads. This fact, Mr. Chesser states, is all the more reason for maintaining the existing laws as a "small
beachhead." '25 In effect, the unions argued that the Department should prove
its performance under the new regulations before Congress abolishes its present
statutory authority.
The fifth area of disagreement was the sanctions and penalties which the
Department could utilize to enforce the provision of the Act. The Administration bill called for the assessment of per diem civil penalties of $350 to $750
for each continued violation of the regulations. In addition it made available
injunctive relief to the Secretary and vested certain general powers of investigation, inspection and enforcement in his office. 2 Mr. Goodfellow of the rail
industry objected to these sanctions asserting that the provisions should contain
a clause limiting its application to "knowing and willful" violations; that a
notice provision should be included; and, that the effective enforcement date
should be such as to allow for the possible correction of alleged violations. 27
The unions, on the other hand, advocated the adoption of the Hartke penalty
scheme which permitted fines from $500 to $1,000, while granting the Secretary
the additional power to issue cease and desist orders. 2 8 On this point, the
Administration contended that the injunctive relief provisions in the act were
sufficient for public interest enforcement purposes.2 '
The Senate Bill
On December 2nd, 1969, S. 1933 as amended was voted from the Senate
Commerce Committee and reported to the floor of the Senate.2 0 It was passed
by the Senate just prior to the Christmas recess and House consideration was
delayed until the start of the second session. The files suggest that prior to
Senate passage, the FRA and the Committee were concerned principally with
the sections on state participation and preemption as well as the question of
31
repealing the existing rail safety statutes,.
Mr. O'Driscoll continued to work with the Hartke Committee furnishing
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 339.
S. Rep. on S.1933, 91st Cong., IstSess. (1969).
DOT-FRA notes 63, 64, 72-77, and 79.
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additional drafts of testimony, analyzing sections of the legislation and preparing amendments to the departmental bill and early committee prints for selected members of the Committee." 2 These drafts were given on an unofficial
basis, with clearance in the Department limited to three or four personnel."'
Again, the tracing procedure reflects quite clearly the extent of the draftsman's
participation in the development, consideration and formulation of departmental policy.3 4
The bill as passed by the Senate was an attempt to pacify all sides on the
question of rail safety. For example, on the use of the phraseology "railroad
operations" in Section 102, the Senate substituted the statement that the Secretary had authority to prescribe rules in "all areas of railroad safety."2 5 On
the question of the existing Federal safety statutes the Committee repealed and
consigned as regulations all but two safety laws. 28 Although this would seem
on its face to be a particularly hard loss for the unions, the absence of total
repeal seemed to discredit the principal arguments relating to the existence of
"piecemeal" laws.
House Action and Final Developments
When the measure came before the House the struggle among the interest
groups and the FRA became essentially a political one. One spokesman indicated that the specifics of the final bill-conforming in virtually all of its parts
to the views of labor-was the result of the "herculean" efforts of Mr. Chesser.237

232. See e.g., DOT-FRA note 73.
233. O'Driscoll Interview, supra note 68.
234. See DOT-FRA notes 63-79. On November 28th, for example, Mr. O'Driscoll suggests in
a memorandum to the Chief Counsel and the FRA administrator changes which should be made
in the Committee print and concessions which the Senate may accept in return. DOT-FRA note
71. He further pointed out that the files necessarily reflected only formal departmental actions in
the legislative process. Details pertaining to the specifics of the bill and the substance of the
committee report in many cases were agreed upon in conference or in oral conversations.
O'Driscoll Interview supra note 68.
235. S. Rep. on S.1933, 91st Cong., IstSess. (1969). Since "operations" is a railroad term of
art meaning only that portion of the entire railroading scheme having to do with the physical
movement of trains, this charge appears to give DOT broader authority.
236. Id. Appendix B of the Senate Report contains the text of those statutes not repealed. Id.
at 40-60.
237. Interview with Mr. Lawrence Mann, DOT, February, 1972. Mr. Mann suggested that in
the Senate the Administration position on the legislation had been most effectively presented by
Senator Prouty of Vermont. In the House, however, a Democratic, pro-labor majority led by
Congressmen Staggers and Moss pushed through the pro-labor version to a receptive chamber.
Others in the department, including Mr. O'Driscoll, agreed that the policy issues in the House
became a secondary consideration to the question of political affiliations and past support.
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DOT continued to act as both liaison and sounding board for the views of
the opposing interests."' Meetings of the principal parties were held in the
Department after which written comments were submitted on the sections in
controversy."' 9 Internally, the chief policymakers of the FRA continued to
review the administration's legislative position, while Mr. O'Driscoll again
prepared updated legislative material for the scheduled committee hearings and
subsequent House Report. 40
FRA Evaluation
The FRA's development of the rail safety legislation was not extraordinarily
skillful. The Project was able to identify a number of problem areas within the
Administration which inhibit the drafting of adequate legislation.
OrganizationalOutlook
Like many administrative agencies the FRA has become industry-oriented to
the virtual exclusion of other group representatives. There were no consumers
groups represented on the Task Force; nor did anyone represent the shipper
viewpoint. Apart from the FRA representatives, the other members of the
group were drawn only from state regulatory bodies, the union and railroad
management groups.24 ' In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee,
Ralph Nader asserted that for years ". . . the Federal Railroad Safety Administration was largely mythical, that it was very poorly named and that the
major decisions were delegated to the railroads, particularly the Association
'
of American Railroads."242
As a result, much legislation initiated within the FRA carries automatically,
and from its inception, a certain bias. It is difficult to draft strong, objective
legislation where institutional factors mold the bill from its very beginning.
The Special Interest Groups
It is highly questionable that the FRA is proceeding correctly when it invites
nongovernmental pressure groups to participate in the development and drafting of a particular piece of legislation. Undoubtedly, input from industry and
O'Driscoll Interview, supra footnote 68.
238. DOT-FRA notes 80 and 87.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See footnote 187 supra.
242. 1969 Hearings, supra footnote 189 at 406.
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other directly affected groups is necessary to develop sufficient knowledge of
the problem area. But to invite these groups to sit in on the drafting stages of
the legislative process reflects poorly on the FRA. The various administrative
agencies were initially intended to develop their own expertise in the area, not
merely to become channels of communication between the lobbying groups
and the Congress.243 Moreover, if the special interest'group approach to
draftsmanship can be supported, how can the FRA justify the narrow views
actually represented on the Railroad Safety Task Force? If the lobbying
group-task force approach is to be justified its base of representation must be
considerably broader. When engaged in the initial consideration of legislation,
the FRA might better produce its own bill based on its own findings, independently of interest group participation.
DOT Participation
Unlike the development of the Airways bill by the FAA, DOT input on the
rail safety legislation was remarkably absent. There were, of course, various
communications between the Secretary and the FRA personnel; but there was
virtually no participation by DOT draftsmen as there was in the Airways bill.
FRA draftsmen, particularly when working directly with the Task Force, might
have profited from the more generalized viewpoint possibly provided by departmental legislative personnel. As a result, the FRA was perhaps more responsive, given the institutional bias of the administration toward the rail industry,
to the narrow viewpoints presented by the lobbying groups.
The DOT Draftsmen
From the Project's examination of the rail safety legislation and the Airport
Airways Act, it is evident that the Department depends upon a small handful
(approximately five or six) professional legislative attorneys who formulate,
draft and comment upon all of its legislative material. The problem is primarily
one of recognizing the importance of training and utilizing professional draftsmen as legislative attorneys.
The tracing of the two bills, reveals a number of problems centering upon
the use of the legislative attorney. In the FAA, the tracing procedure in the
Airport legislation and the administration's past performance in appropriation
matters, revolved around the effectiveness and operations of the sub-agency
legislative offices. For a period of over one year, the Airways Bill wallowed
243. Furthermore, it appeared that much of the industry and union testimony at the Senate
and House hearings was a self-serving attempt to develop a favorable legislative history, not to
provide Congress with the information necessary to enact an adequate piece of legislation.
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about in the FAA's legislative office. While it is evident that certain internal
policy differences existed among the policymakers in the FAA at the time, the
files and the committee testimony suggest that the FAA lacked the necessary
supportive legislative materials for promotion of the idea politically. Only after
the appointment of Mr. Chernick to the position of Assistant Secretary for
Policy and International Affairs in 1969 and the transfer of drafting and coordination responsibility on the Airways Bill to the DOT General Counsel's
Office did the FAA develop a viable piece of legislation.
Problems evident in the FRA relating to the attorney-draftsmen, reveal
defects of a different nature. The FRA is constricted by institutional leanings
toward industry and unduly hampered in its objectivity by too close participation of special interest groups in its drafting process. In sum, the FAA appears
to need more skilled professional draftsmen at the sub-departmental level; the
FRA should permit its draftsmen to draft without industry interference.
Again, while this would indicate fundamental political problems which are
important to discussion of the Department's legislative process, it indicates also
the manner in which the legislative draftsman is employed and the viewpoint
of an executive agency toward the legislative process.
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Department of Transportation-Federal Railroad Administration Files
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (DOT-FRA)
FILE NO.1(10/4/67-12/30/68)

This file begins with the finding by the department that
railroad accidents are increasing at an alarming rate. Hearings are held in the House on a number of bills, however,
none is reported during the Second Session of the 89th Congress. The files begin to indicate the legislative process involved, while noting quite clearly the reasons for failure of
passage.

FILE NO. 11 (1/10/69-6/10/69)

The department continues to work on a bill, but soon decides that a Task Force consisting of railroad management,
labor and the state regulatory agencies can best establish the
general objectives and scope of such legislation. Senator
Hartke introduces S.1933 and holds hearings in late March.
The Task Force issues a unanimous report consisting of
eight recommendations in the area of rail safety.

FILE NO. 111 (6/10/69-9/12/69)

The Task Force members and DOT work to implement the
eight recommendations. A draft bill is reported to the Secretary, with some dissenting remarks on particular provisions.
The proximity with which the FRA and the interest groups
work together and the duties of the legislative draftsman in
the DOT are outlined clearly.

FILE NO.IV (10/6/69-12/15/69)

The department drafts its own proposal, S. 3061, for the
Senate's consideration. Hearings are held during October
on this Administration measure and the Hartke bill. The
differences between the Task Force members that were indicated earlier become quite clear. S.1933, as amended, is
reported by the Commerce Committee and passes the Senate in late December, 1969.

FILE NO.V (1/30/70-6/15/70)

Early hearings are scheduled in the House on three proposals. Contact between the FRA, higher policymakers in DOT
and the Task Force members continues. Legislative duties
of the Chief Counsel's office are consistent throughout this
period. The March hearings reveal two substantial issues
which divide the interested parties. S.1933 is reported by the
House Committee on June 15, 1970, but it contains major
changes from the Senate version.

Legislative History
Aug. 6, 1970

House debated and passed S.1933.

Sept. 24, 1970

Conference Rept. on S.1933, H. Rept. 91-1467.

Sept. 28, 1970

House and Senate agree on Conference Report to S.1933.

Oct. 7, 1970

S.1933 signed into law by President Nixon.

POSITION

NAME
FILE NO. I
I.

Mr. Boyd

Secretary of DOT, (1967-1969).
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Mr. Magnuson

Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce
Committee.

3. Mr. O'Driscoll

Attorney, DOT; primary draftsman on the Federal Railroad Safety legislation for the FRA.

4.

Congressman Staggers, Chairman of the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee.

2.

Mr. Staggers

5. Mr. Menk

President, Northern Pacific Ry., St. Paul, Minn.

6. Mr. Corcoran

General Counsel, FRA.

7.

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.

Mr. Humphrey

FILE NO. I1
8.

Mr. Bernstein

Attorney, FRA Gen. Counsel's Office.

9.

Mr. Lang

Attorney, FRA Gen. Counsel's Office.

10. Mr. Furphy

Attorney, FRA, Gen. Counsel's Office.

11. Mr. Cherington

Asst. Sec. for Policy and International Affairs, DOT.

Mr. Hartke
Mr. Davis

Senator Hartke, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee.

Mr. Minor

Attorney, Sect. Chief, DOT Regulations Division.

Mr. Volpe

Secretary Volpe, DOT.

Mr. Whitman

Administrator, FRA.

FILE NO. III
17. Mr. Dulski
18. Mr. Loftus
19. Mr. Ashley
20. Mr. Fain
21. Mr. Magoon
22. Mr. Lyon
23. Mr. Goodfellow

Attorney, FRA, Gen. Counsel's Office.

Congressman Dulski.
Attorney, FRA Gen. Counsel's Office.
Congressman Ashley.
Chairman, Missouri Public Service Commission.
Representative, Michigan Railroad Division.
Deputy Administrator, FRA.
President of the Association of American Railroads (AAR).

24. Mr. Chesser

National Legislative Director of the United Transportation
Union (UTU).

25. Mr. Ross

Attorney, FRA Gen. Counsel's Office.

FILE NO. IV
26. Mr. Tidd

General Counsel, DOT.

27. Mr. Schultz

Director, OMB.

28. Mr. Cotton

Senator Cotton, Vermont.

29. Mr. Rodgers

General Counsel, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.

30. Mr. Mattorey

Vice President, AARR.

FRA
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FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY BILL
(DOT-FRA)
FILE NO. I
I.

Oct. 4, 1967

Subject: Memorandum on Liability of Government.
1. Supplying funds for increased maintenance and safety
devices at rail crossings.
2. Increased participation and responsibility for maintenance of such devices under the Federaj Tort Claims Act.
Comment: Earliest memo on RR Safety Bill; seems to
have originated from general discussion of RR safety.

2.
3.

Memorandum on Gas and Pipeline Safety Bill.

Feb. 6, 1968

Subject:

March 18, 1968

From Secretary of DOT, Boyd, to Member, House of Representatives.
Subject:

Government liability re pipeline legislation.

4.

Dec. 1967

Statistics on railroad accidents and resulting injuries.
At this time H.R. 16,980 introduced and referred to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

5.

April 10, 1968

Senator Magnuson reads a letter into Congressional Record
that appeared in Washington Post. Indicates that he will ask
the FRA for immediate report on this matter. Over a year
has lapsed since RR Safety was made his responsibility and,
to date, only action has been a reorganization of FRA
Bureau of RR Safety. The letter indicated that the National
Transportation Safety Board was concerned "that train accidents were increasing at an alarming rate."

6.

May 2, 1968

H.R. 16,980, a bill on Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1968.
Introduction.

7.

May 8, 1968

Release by Association of American RRs claiming that
safety record for RRs was good.

8.

May 10, 1968

Remarks of Alan Boyd, Sec. of DOT to the Denver Chamber of Commerce on RR Safety.

9.

May 16, 1968

Outline
1.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

of RR Safety Bill testimony:
Introduction
The Current Rail Safety Picture
Need for Changed Authority
Current State Regulatory Programs
Background of Proposed Legislation
Discussion of Proposed Legislation
Relationshp With Other Pending Bills
How New Authority Would Be Used
Closing Comment

Comment: Bill testimony seems to be done by both the
FRA's General Counsel's Office and the policy people in
DOT. Generally the outline of the testimony and a substantial portion of the drafts will be done by General Counsel's
Office and, specifically, Mr. O'Driscoll.
10. May 23, 1968

Hearings before the House Interstate and Commerce Committee on proposed rail safety legislation. Testimony of Mr.
Louis W. Menk.
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Draft on Cost of Broadened Safety Regulation to the Railroad Industry.
$25 million each annually (1) more careful track inspection
and spot maintenance; (2) more periodic freight equipment
inspection; (3) more employee safety training.
Conclusion: Value of the Safety results should be commensurate with cost of carrying out and adhering to the
regulations.

12. May 2, 1968

S.4811 introduced in the Senate; DOT Bill on RR safety
legislation is introduced, S.3426.

13. June 17, 1968

2nd and 3rd Draft Revision of H.R. 16980.
Letter from Sec. of DOT Boyd to Congressman Staggers of
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce discussing:
(1) The justification of § Il(c) of H.R. 16,980 (Accident
Reports)
(2) Reports on RR Accidents and Casualties.

14. Nov. 1968

Background Memo on H.R. 16,980-Proposed Rail Bill.
(I) After hearings apparent that "while the majority of the
Committee was probably in favor of some kind of legislation, the Bill, as presented to them, was not being well received . . . . putting aside indirect factors such as the gas
pipeline safety controversy, the breadth and scope of the Bill
was apparently disturbing to both labor and management."
Generally noted five areas with problems:
(1) Scope of § 3(a) (3) relating to the qualifications of
employees and operating rules.
(2) Federal preemption of State jurisdiction.
(3) Jurisdiction.
(4) Inclusion of employees in civil and criminal penalties.
(5) The use of APA requirements in issuance of regulations.
(6) Definition of rail commerce in relation to local transit
and operations.
Memo Continues:
Another concern of the Committee was failure of RR and
Brotherhood to get together on the legislation.
(1) Carriers opposed in toto to the Bill.
(2) Brotherhoods proposed 44 amendments to Bill.
(3) Staggers made clear that he was going to have some
legislation.
(4) After hearings carriers did nothing for a week.
(5) Unions came up with a completely new Bill. Main
point being that they want it unlawful for any carrier to use
equipment found defective or unsafe by department and
have exempted all matters coming within the purview of
Collective Bargaining Agreements under the RR Labor
Act.
Note added that a more detailed critique provided with our
revision of H.R. 16,980.
A Study is suggested on the labor-management relation
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under § 3(a)(3), since it was so uncertain in the minds of all
on the appropriate legislation.
Comment: This memo summarizes fairly clearly the failure of passage in the 2nd Session of the 90th Congress.
Moreover, it analyzes the reasons for the problems and cites
generally those areas for concern in the FRA's revision of
H.R. 16,980.
15. Dec. 27, 1968

A section by section analysis of the Bill that DOT will propose for the 91st Congress.

16. Dec. 30, 1968

From Secretary Boyd to Vice President Humphrey.
Subject: Notes differences between H.R. 16,980 in the
90th Congress and the proposed FRSA of 1969 and the bill
itself.

FILE NO. II
17. Jan. 10, 1969

From Mr. Corcoran, FRA Administrator, to Mr.
O'Driscoll.
Subject: A letter from Mr. Bernstein, an attorney for the
Railway Labor Executive Association, to the FRA on the
proposed safety legislation. Mr. Bernstein suggests revisions
of the Bill offered by Cong. Staggers on June 17, 1968.
Specifically comments on problem areas of the Bill:
(I) Should the Bill be broad or narrow?
(2) The question of State preemption.
(3) Effect on Labor.
(4) Hearings-an APA requirement.
(5) Sanction question.
(6) Industrial relations.

18. Feb. 6, 1969

From Mr. Corcoran, Chief Counsel-FRA, to Mr. Lang.
Subject: Wants Mr. O'Driscoll to make changes on the
Bill and circulate the changes and an attached analysis for
comment.

19. Feb. II,1969

From the Administrator to the Secretary, DOT.
Subject: Briefing on the Rail Safety Act.
(1) Role of DOT to this point.
(2) Mandate from Congress to take effective action.
(3) Efforts made in other fields.
(4) Bill proposed in 1968.
(5) History of Rail Safety-Statute now a patchwork of
separate efforts over the past two decades.

20. Feb. II,1969

From Mr. Furphy, the enforcement attorney in the Chief
Counsel's Office. FRA, to Mr. O'Driscoll.
Subject: Technical inquiry on the rail legislation.

21. Feb. II,1969

From FRA Chief to Secretary of DOT.
Subject: To brief the Secretary on a meeting with the representatives of the Railroad Unions scheduled for Friday,
February 14, 1969.
Comment: Memo written by Mr. O'Driscoll. This meeting is set for one day after the tripartite idea arises.
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Memo written by Mr. MacAnanny, the Ass't Secretary of
Policy and International Affairs, DOT.
Subject: Memo on the February 13, 1969, idea (no papers
found relating to the initiation of this particular idea) of
establishing a tripartite task force on the question of rail
safety. It is established for purposes of legislative approval.
Want to broaden the scope of inquiry because the carriers
(RRs) do. The three parties would consist of labor, management and the state regulatory agencies. They realize that
they probably won't come up with a unified approach to rail
legislation, but suggest that it is important (I) to have the
parties examine the problems outside the Congressional
hearing rooms and (2) to permit DOT to say that it has
conducted such exercise and is able to identify common
concerns if not agreement.
There is possibility of early hearings on bill submitted by
Staggers (Feb. 18, 1969) so priority.
Contains draft for Secretary with submission of the idea and
its purposes for comment to Acting Administrator of FRA.

23. Feb. 18, 1969
24. April 22, 1969

Cong. Staggers' Bill-H.R, 7068.
S.1933 introduced in the Senate by Senator Hartke.
Comment: It seems that this Bill was drafted and formulated in part at least by the Administration. Mr. O'Driscoll
seems to have written at least two drafts of the Bill and those
have been commented on by Mr. Davis and Mr. Furphy of
the FRA.

25. No Date

Hearings are to be conducted on S.1933. Mr. O'Driscoll
prepares for the FRA Administrator testimony and briefs
on possible questions, e.g.:
What can you do to help eliminate the hazardous materials
derailment problem?
What did you have to do with the Army's decision to move
nerve gas by rail? Did you approve the route? Why not?
What could have been done? etc.

26. No Date

From Mr. O'Driscoll to Mr. Minor, a section chief of the
Regulations Division of the General Counsel's Office of
DOT.
Subject: Memo on regulations that are applicable to Rail
Safety now, facts on accidents. Given to Task Force as
information.

27. May 14, 1969

Comments by Mr. O'Driscoll on S.1933, a draft. Noted that
the Task Force has been appointed and is at work.
Comment: Mr. O'Driscoll has the constant duty of writing
memos explaining, reviewing and analyzing bills affecting
the FRA before Congress. He also seems to be the coordinator for the FRA regarding the Task Force.

28. May 12, 1969

Statement of Labor views on Rail Safety submitted by the
Labor members of the Task Force to the whole body.
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29. April 18, 1969

DOT Secretary Volpe has announced the formation of a
special task force on Railroad Safety.

30. May 16, 1969

Second draft of comments on selected sections of S.1933.
Mr. Furphy and Mr. Davis are asked to supply additional
remarks.

31. May 16, 1969

Mr. Lang submits testimony outline to be used before Senate Subcommittee on Safety Bill.

32. May 20, 1969

Testimony of Mr. Whitman (the FRA Administrator) before the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation.
Sen. Hartke asks for further statements in addition to Mr.
Whitman's testimony. Wants a comparison of motor carriers and Natural Gas & Pipeline Safety Act as applicable
to Railroads.

33. May 23, 1969

Analysis of agreement and differences between the three
units in the Task Force by Mr. Whitman.

34. June 2, 1969

Draft of Task Force Report with statement of positions and
a draft of a Bill. Also a section by section analysis of the
Bill.

35. June 10, 1969

Mr. Whitman's recommendations re Task Force.
Comment: From testimony of Mr. Whitman on S.1933,
Secretary Volpe established the Task Force, "made up of
top representatives of RR management, RR labor and State
regulatory agencies." The (Task Force) staff examined the
issues presented regarding the differences found in the positions of the three groups and on June 30, 1969, issued a
report to the Secretary of Transportation with eight specific
recommendations. Report represents not the official view of
DOT, but Task Force view on what can be done to reverse
upward trend in rail accidents.

FILE NO. III
36. No Date

DOT Secretary calls the Task Force report of June 30,
1969, a "landmark of cooperation." Wants to cover RR
Safety with regulatory authority and be sure that all areas
(of RR service) are covered. FRA Administrator to comment on Task Force report.
Comment: Earlier hearings held much of the background
of the bill. Their big safety worry seems to be in the movement of chemicals, gases and explosives by RR.

37. No Date

Memo examines excerpts from Task Force Report.

38. July 10, 1969

Early draft-trying to implement the recommendations of
the Task Force.
Report of the Task Force on July 8, 1969, of the Congressional Record, H. 5707, Remarks of Mr. Dulski, lists all
members of Task Force.

39. July 17, 1969

Mr. Loftus drafts a bill, makes notes on previous drafts
done within the Task Force and the FRA.

40. July 17, 1969

Mr. O'Driscoll, a draft.

41. July 18, 1969

Comments on earlier Staff draft.
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42. July 23, 1969

FRA Staff draft of the Bill.

43. Aug. 5, 1969

Draft here by the Task Force as a whole; does not solve all
the problems between the three representative groups. A bill
on the subject of rail safety introduced at this time by Congressman Ashley.
Comment: Mr. Corcoran was at this time the Chief Counsel for the FRA. Seems to have been a problem finding
people for the top administrative positions of the FRA.
(Chief Counsel, FRA Administrator and FRA Deputy
Administrator).

44. Aug. 8, 1969

Changes to the draft of Aug. 5, 1969, asked by the Association of American Railroads (AARR).
Members of Task Force:
Mr. Fain-From the Missouri Public Service Commission.
Mr. Magoon-From the Railroad Division of Michigan.
Mr. Lyon-the Deputy Administrator of FRA.
Mr. Goodfellow-President of the Association of American
RRs.
Mr. Chesser-National Legislation Director of the United
Transportaion Union.

45. Aug. 14, 1969
Aug. 12, 1969

Draft written by Mr. Lyon after meeting of the Task Force
on Aug. 14, 1969.
Draft on § 5(a) of the proposed Bill.

Aug. 13, 1969

Mr. O'Driscoll-view of the June 30th Task Force Report.

Aug. 25, 1969

Another Bill introduced in House; comment made regarding
its effect as to the RR Safety Bill and a question raised as
to who will have the authority to administer the Act.

49. Aug. 20, 1969

Mr. Lyon, the Deputy Adm. FRA, writes another draft of
the Bill-based on prior talks between representative
groups.

50. Aug. 26, 1969

Mr. Lyon now Acting Administrator of FRA.

51. Aug. 26, 1969

From Mr. Ross to Mr. O'Driscoll.
Subject: A proposed draft of § 4; he has redrafted the
section and submits as to its meaning and possible interpretation.

52. Sept. 3, 1969

From Mr. Fain of the Missouri Public Service Commission
to FRA.
Subject:

53. Sept. 12, 1969

Redrafts of Sections 4, 5 and 8 with comments.

From Mr. Chesser, labor representative, to Mr. Whitman,
FRA Administrator.
Subject: A complaint that on August 28, 1969, the FRA
came down with a decision which relieved the RRs of some
rules and regulations under the Power Brake Law of 1958,
without a hearing. He is disturbed and suggests that in a
recodification (such as would be involved in the RR Safety
Act) he can't trust the FRA.

54. Sept. 12, 1969

The first completed draft proposed by the entire Task
Force; will be sent to the Secretary. The three representative
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groups are not now in agreement, as they had been in the
June 30, 1969, report on the need for the legislation. They
specify their differences.
Draft Bill entitled the Federal Railroad Safety and Research Act of 1969.
FILE NO. IV
55. Oct. 6-9, 1969

Denver meeting of State Regulatory Commissioners. At the
meeting Federal-State cooperation stressed.

56. Oct. 7, 1969

From Mr. O'Driscoll to the Deputy Adm. of the FRA.
Subject: On Oct. 2, 1969, there appeared in the Congressional Record the "Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act. 1969" (S.2917). Pertinent sections of the Coal Bill will
apply to and relate to similar ideas that they (FRA) are
trying to get into their Bill.
(I) Review by Sec. of DOT
(2) Judicial Review
(3) Penalties
(4) Administration of Act.
(5) State Plans
(6) Effect on State Laws.
Comment: Part of Mr. O'Driscoll's function was to check
the Congressional Record to note the legislation introduced
or comments made that affect the Department and the legislation that it is proposing.
Memo suggests that Mr. Whitman check pgs.
(I) S.9297
(2) S.9300
(3) S.9301
Congressional Record Aug. 6, 1969.
(I) Introduction of the Occupational Health and Safety
Act of 1969.
(2) Congressional findings and purpose of S.2788.
(3) comment on the Federal-State relationship issue of
the Rail Safety Bill.
-Relationship to other Federal Programs.
-Grants to states.
-Effect of other laws.

57. No Date

Comment: Have only been able to find the one draft of
final Task Force report (Sept. 12) that went to DOT. Markup must have been done by (1) DOT-Mr. Tidd and his
legislative staff; (2) Mr. O'Driscoll and FRA; (3) resubmission by Task Force; (4) combination of one or more of the
above.

58. Oct. 15, 1969

Rail Safety Bill sent from DOT-OMB to the Congress.
Speaker letter accompanied with an analysis of the Bill.
(S.3061)
In this file also are: (1) Key questions and answers on S.
3061. (2) Comparison of S.1933 and S.3061. (3) Comments
on Rail Safety Bill from prior Committee Hearings, (4)
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Discussion paper with analysis of affect of S.3061. (5) Analysis of FRA Budget re Safety regulation.
59. Oct. 22, 1969

Final Draft of Bill as submitted reported in Cong. Rec. Oct.
22, 1969, S.13,031.
Comment: File does not contain any comments of other
agencies affected by the Legislation. Moreover, the File
does not reflect any correspondence with OMB.

60. Oct. 20, 1969

From the Acting Chief of the FRA Policy Division to the
Deputy Administrator of the FRA.
Subject: Draft of possible questions relating to the Secretary's testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee.

61. No Date

From Mr. Schultz, Director, OMB, to FRA.
Subject: The relationship and scope of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act and that proposed in the RR Safety
and Research Act.
Issue: Who has authority to regulate occupational health
and safety of the RR workers generally, as contrasted with
those involved in railroad accidents? (Conflict here seemed
to involve the Dept. of Labor and the FRA).
Comment: No correspondence available on this but interviews disclosed that the matter had to be decided at a policymaking level in OMB and the White House. It seems that
matters affecting the jurisdiction or authority of conflicting
agencies or departments do not normally get resolved
through the commenting process, but in the conference and
mark-up sessions conducted with the appropriate policy
people in OMB. Brings to question again the present interdepartmental commenting process; on matters of minor significance to the department it becomes a paper-shuffling
function between the agencies and in those of some substance, the departments often, as a matter of politics, will
leave the matter unresolved to the point where crisis management must be employed to settle the dispute.

62. Oct. 28, 1969

Secretary Volpe testifies before the Senate Commerce Committee on S.3061.
Chart made of state activity in the area of safety regulation.
The concern stems from the fact that the proposed law will
usurp state regulation with federal safety standards and federal control.
Chart also of existing RR safety statutes and present FRA
authority to change by regulation.

63. Nov. 10, 1969

The Administration Bill is S.3061 and is different from the
Task Force bill.
Comment: S.1933 introduced by Sen. Hartke, on RR
Safety, is supported by Mr. Chesser, the legislative representative of Railway Labor Executive's Association and a
member of the Task Force.
Substantial part of Mr. O'Driscoll's duty is to prepare and
supply drafts, comments and memos not only for the FRA
and DOT, but for the Senate and House Committee's needs.
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Comments or analysis on proposed amendments to S.3061.
64. Nov. 10, 1969

Comparison of provisions of S.1933 (Labor Bill) and S.3061
(Adm.).
Key questions and answers on S.3061.

65. Nov. 4, 1969
66. Nov. It, 1969

Draft of additional testimony of FRA regarding RR Safety
sent to Sen. Hartke.
Draft of proposed amendments to RR Safety Act (S.3061)

§§ 5 and 6.
67. Nov. 13, 1969

A senator writes Secretary Volpe saying that he won't be
able to support what he thinks will be the amendments made
to RR Safety Act.

68. Nov. 14, 1969

Draft of amendments to S.3061 submitted informally to
several members of Senate Commerce Committee. As a
staff service only by FRA-never formally approved by
FRA or DOT. Comments appear as to the effect of such
amendments.

69. Nov. 17, 1969

FRA suggested changes to the subcommittee draft.

70. Nov. 24, 1969

Briefing paper compiled for Mr. Beggs and Mr. Baker re
Rail Safety Bill-S.1933.

71. Nov. 28, 1969

From Mr. O'Driscoll to Administrator and Chief Counsel
of FRA. Wants to make some changes. Discusses what concessions are needed.

72. Nov. 25, 1969

Subject:

Memo on Federal-State problem in Rail Safety.

§7-"is not a model of clarity." It apparently means that
with two exceptions, the federal government would not enforce the safety laws when the states have obtained certification through the FRA or adopt proper enforcement machinery.
Suggests a workable solution to the Federal-State problem
with changes to §§ 6 and 7.
Comment: This is an administration bill and a committee
print with some changes. The Task Force had been formed
because of the failure of the previous Congress to work out
a reasonable federal approach to the rail safety problem.
Little agreement now among the most interested parties.
Task Force had submitted report which all signed. It was
based on certain fundamental provisions which everyone
could accept.
When the Bill (S.3061) was drafted by the Administration,
some of the principles of the Task Force were deleted by
DOT, e.g. the certification principle that the states wanted
and DOT found unacceptable.
§ 6-Pre-emption of State authority by federal law.
§ 7-Certification of states to conduct safety programs regarding RR.
The above sections are the most controversial of the Bill.
Problem over certification centers around the authority to
regulate. Seems as if the Department is going to have to
compromise its position of federal regulation.
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Cong. Rec. S.15295-Motor Vehicle Safety Authority and
National Transportation Act.
Note on Rail Safety Bill-again an explanation of the provisions: (I) purpose in setting a deadline of Sept. 1, 1970; (2)
an analysis of § 6; (3) purpose of § 6; (4) analysis of § 7;
(5) purpose of § 7.
explanations of State participation and State authority to
regulate.
has handwritten rough drafts available.
Sen. Norris Cotton (R.-N.H.) wants DOT's views prior to
Dec. 2, 1969, on RR legislation. Final consideration at that
time by the Senate Commerce Committee.
Washington Star article, Dec. 2, 1969, on Rail Safety Standards.
Sen. Cotton wants comments specifically on the provisions
of the Committee Print:
6 revised to make rail safety requirements as nationally
uniform as practicable. States retain their standards, but
once the federal government sets standard on particular subject matter-the State standards are pre-empted. In local
situations the State could regulate.
-§

74. Dec. 2, 1969

RR Safety Bill (S.1933) voted out of Committee.
Comment: It did not include revisions of § 6 and § 7 as
desired by FRA. Only through the General Counsel, the
FRA, OMB and White House pressure were they able to get
some modifications to the committee bill which was reported to the Senate.

75. No Date

Hearings scheduled before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, on
S.1933, H.R. 7068, 14,417, and 14,478.

76.

From Mr. O'Driscoll to General Counsel of Commerce
Committee of U.S. Senate.

Dec. 17, 1969

Subject: Effect of repealing the existing rail safety statutes
on the federal employer's liability suits.
-states five issues and discusses each.
77. No Date

Another analysis of § 7, State participation.
Comment: There has seemed to be a constant review of
the different sections of the Bill. It is likely that it became
a necessity because of the frequent changes made and/or
suggested by the outside "interest" groups, the Committees
and the administration itself. With the task force approach
the FRA had to find common ground for regulation first,
establish and defend an administration bill and then contend
with the views of the Commerce Committee, particularly on
the issues of state certification and regulation.

78. Dec. 13, 1969

FRA Administrator holds staff meeting on bill and discusses its possibilities re the 2nd Session of the 91st Congress.

79. Dec. 15, 1969

Mr. O'Driscoll makes advance drafts of Senate Commerce
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Committee Report to accompany the Rail Safety Bill and
sends copies to Mr. Lyons, Mr. Loftus, Mr. Tidd and Mr.
Conway.
S.1933 passes Senate.
FILE NO. V
80. Jan. 30, 1970

From Mr. Kessler, Chief Counsel, FRA, to Mr. Rodgers,
Gen. Counsel of National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners. Mr. Mattorey, Vice President, Association
American Railroads, Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Ross.
These people are on the Task Force and they continue to be
consulted re departmental changes regarding the RR safety
legislation.
The Task Force held a meeting on Jan. 26, 1970. They were
informed of the necessity for comments on S.1933 as requested by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce.
Contains written draft of proposed amendments to S.1933
by FRA and asks for comments.

81. Jan. 7, 1970

Policy meeting of FRA. Messrs. Lyon, Rogers, Loftus and
O'Driscoll attend.

82. Jan. 25, 1970

List of items of concern to FRA regarding the rail safety
legislation.

83. No Date

Memo on Rail Safety covers:
(I) Role of Department in safety.
(2) Accident reports on RRs.
(3) Review of past proposals and History of rail safety
legislation to date.
(4) Current thinking on the subject.

84. March 1970

Memo, questions and answers on rail safety legislation.
Contains facts regarding rail accidents and necessity for
legislation.

85. Mar. 13, 1970

Memo. Reasons for Repeal of existing rail safety statutes;
draft by Mr. O'Driscoll.

86. Mar. 16, 1970

Questions and answers for Secretary Volpe's testimony before the House Committee

87. Mar. 17, 1970

Secretary Volpe gives testimony to Committee chaired by
Cong. Staggers.
Cong. Staggers requests additional views of DOT on
S.1933. Two problems of the legislation seem to be:
(1) Nature and extent of State involvement.
(2) Combining the past Rail Safety Statutes into single
federal law.
On Feb. 10, 1970, Mr. Kessler, the FRA Chief Counsel, had
received comments from Mr. Chesser on S.1933 with proposed amendments. The labor view generally is that they
want to be able to sue (bring civil suit for damages) and
want to retain old statutes on safety legislation.
(afraid to replace 50 years of legislative work which the
unions had to fight for; fear new combined package will be
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open to interpretation in courts and might diminish what
rights the rail workers have under existing law).
Memo on whether the replacement of existing statutes by
administrative regulation could diminish the rights of rail
employees in civil suits.
88. Mar. 18, 1970

DOT answers additional questions of House Commerce
Committee on rail safety legislation.
-amendments to S.1933 proposed from Secretary Volpe's
testimony before the House Committee.

89. April 4, 1970

Subsequent letter sent by DOT explaining fully the provisions of the Bill before the House Committee.

90. June 15, 1970

S.1933 reported from House Commerce Committee.

